

SecureGas numbers and consortium





Project Title:	Securing the European Gas Network
Starting date	1 June 2019
Ending Date	30 November 2021
Budget info	9.194.410,60 € (funding around 7M€)
Partners	21 partners

SECUREGAS COORDINATOR:



SECUREGAS PARTNERS:










































SecureGas Focus: EU Gas Network









SecureGas focuses on key elements (e.g. installations, pipelines) of the +140.000 Km of the European Gas **network** from Production to Transmission up to Distribution

.... In 3 specific targeted areas:


- Greece
- Lithuania
- Italy

SecureGas project





- OVERALL OBJETIVE: To increase the SECURITY &
 RESILIENCE of the EU Gas Critical Infrastructure
 (e.g. network and installations), by taking into
 account both physical and cyber threats, as well
 as and their combination
- APPROACH: Resilience-based approach to tackle cyber-physical risks and threats to the Gas network and installations



National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA Science News. Severe Space Weather – Social and Economic Impacts. June: http://science.asa.gov.


NATURAL EVENTS

MAN-MADE ACCIDENTS

CYBER ATTACKS

Cyber Threats

- Energy systems and suppliers are target of ransomware and cyberattacks
- The number of incidents reported in the O&G sector is less if compared to physical incidents.
 Main ones:
 - Cyber attacks on OT network of SCADA systems
 - Ransomware attacks
- The impact (financial damage) is high
 - Global figures estimate that cybersecurity breaches in oil and gas and power cost operators \$1,87 billion up to 2018



https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual Reports/FY2016 Industrial Control Systems Assessment Summary Report S508C.pdf

Security level: RINA/CL/SENSITIVE

Reference Scenarios: Cyber





Cyber-Attack to the control networks of energy grid triggered by a gas grid operator

Source:

https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/ EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-

2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3





Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Source: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-049a



Cyberattack on gas pipeline data network

Source: https://www.thelocal.it/20171212/italy-state-of-emergency-austria-explosion-gas



Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Original release date: February 18, 2020



Reference Scenarios: Cyber





Cyber-Attack to Colonial Pipeline

Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password - The hack took down the largest fuel pipeline in the U.S. and led to shortages across the East Coast.

It was the result of a single compromised password

Hackers gained **entry** into the networks of Colonial Pipeline Co. **on April 29 through a virtual private network account**

May 7th, an employee in Colonial's control room saw a ransom note

May 7th Colonial shuts down the pipeline

Colonial began resuming service on May 12th

No breach the more critical operational technology systems

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/hackers-breached-colonial-pipeline-using-compromised-password




It was the first time Colonial had shut down the entirety of its gasoline pipeline system in its 57-year history

Colonial paid the hackers a \$4.4 million ransom

Solutions







Validated in 3 Business Cases







BC3: Operationalising cyber-physical resilience for the security and asset integrity of strategic gas installation.

It addresses Production and Transportation (**Upstream to Midstream**) with particular emphasis on import pipelines and connections with National Grids.




BC1: Risk-based security asset life-cycle management.



Transportation and Distribution (Midstream up to Downstream) of Gas at strategic (project planning), tactical (project risk assessment) and operational (Distribution Network) level









BC2: Impact and cascading effect of cyber-physical attack.



Transportation network (midstream) with particular emphasis to vital nodes of the network, that if damaged could cause significant disruptions and cascading effects to interconnected (energy) infrastructures


Business Case 1



Compliance with the "Common Risk Assessment Approach" as required by EU Regulation 2017/1938







Identify malicious physical presence near critical gas infrastructures and suspicious objects detected from the cameras and input sensors within or near the Cis.

RISK AWARE INFORMATION TO THE POPULATION

Enable Gas CI operators to (efficiently) notify authorities (civil protection, first responders, other CI operators) on an emergency.

CYBER PHYSICAL CORRELATOR

A Machine Learning based tool for advanced event processing to monitor the resources of the SecureGas platform, as well as different components, aggregating the information in order to detect threats.

JOINT CYBER-PHYSICAL RISK & RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Enhance the security and resilience of gas CI networks, covering the main principles imposed by Resilience and Disaster Risk Management Cycle.



Business Case 2



Compliance with the ""running .. scenarios of disruption of gas supply (e.g. transmission infrastructure, storages) ...Assessing their likely consequences";" of EU Regulation 2017/1938



RESILIENCE OF THE IT/OT NETWORKS

Improving security weaknesses in interface points between IT and OT networks (e.g. hacked/infected control server issuing fault/non reliable commands via OT (SCADA) protocol, fault information report).

UAVS FOR LEAKS DETECTION

Application of UAVs for leaks detection of buried pipelines and decision support to the operator.

GAS NETWORK MODELLING AND SIMULATIONS

Modelling and simulation of coupled gas grids, combining the already available modelling techniques with a thorough inclusion of quantitative response and recovery models.

JOINT CYBER-PHYSICAL RISK & RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Enhance the security and resilience of gas CI networks, covering the main principles imposed by Resilience and Disaster Risk Management Cycle.






Business Case 3



Compliance with the ""develop and agree on preventive and emergency measures"" as required by EU Regulation 2017/1938







Research & Innovation as an opportunity





- In a dynamically evolving context, the challenges poses by Cyber Threats are even more relevant
- New and more complex type of attacks will cause severe consequences to the Energy (O&G)
 companies at both operational and financial level (see for instance the Colonial Pipeline)
- There is the **need for more and new "solutions"** to cope with these issues and **for a "paradigm" shift** that moves **from PROTECTION TO RESILIENCE**, aimed at preventing, promptly detecting, timely responding to and cost-effectively recovering from disruptions caused by cyber Threats
- Research & Innovation in this field is therefore essential not only at "operational" level with new tools, solutions and applications to be developed but also at "strategic" level to enforce a Resilience approach into the management processes of the organizations





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