



# SecureGas

Securing the European Gas Network




SecureGas project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No 833017

# SecureGas numbers and consortium



<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Securing the European Gas Network</b>
<b>Starting date</b>	1 June 2019
<b>Ending Date</b>	30 November 2021
<b>Budget info</b>	9.194.410,60 € (funding around 7M€)
<b>Partners</b>	21 partners

## SECUREGAS COORDINATOR:




## SECUREGAS PARTNERS:





# SecureGas Focus: EU Gas Network

## MAIN GAS TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN EUROPE<sup>(\*)</sup>



SecureGas focuses on key elements (e.g. installations, pipelines) of the +140.000 Km of the **European Gas network** from Production to Transmission up to Distribution


... In 3 specific targeted areas:

- 1) Greece
- 2) Lithuania
- 3) Italy

# SecureGas project



- OVERALL OBJECTIVE:** To increase the **SECURITY & RESILIENCE** of the EU Gas Critical Infrastructure (e.g. network and installations), by taking into account both physical and cyber threats, as well as and their combination
- APPROACH:** **Resilience-based** approach to tackle cyber-physical risks and threats to the Gas network and installations



National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Science News, Severe Space Weather – Social and Economic Impacts, June 2009 at [http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2009/21jan\\_severespaceweather/](http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2009/21jan_severespaceweather/)

NATURAL EVENTS

MAN-MADE ACCIDENTS

CYBER ATTACKS




# Cyber Threats

- Energy systems and suppliers are target of ransomware and cyberattacks
- The **number of incidents** reported in the O&G sector is **less** if compared to physical incidents.

## Main ones :

- Cyber attacks on OT network of SCADA systems
  - Ransomware attacks
- The **impact (financial damage) is high**
  - Global figures estimate that *cybersecurity breaches in oil and gas and power cost operators \$1,87 billion up to 2018*



[https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual\\_Reports/FY2016\\_Industrial\\_Control\\_Systems\\_Assessment\\_Summary\\_Report\\_S5o8C.pdf](https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Reports/FY2016_Industrial_Control_Systems_Assessment_Summary_Report_S5o8C.pdf)

# Reference Scenarios: Cyber

## Cyber-Attack to the control networks of energy grid triggered by a gas grid operator

Source:

[https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=3](https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3)



## Cyberattack on gas pipeline data network

Source: <https://www.thelocal.it/20171212/italy-state-of-emergency-austria-explosion-gas>

## Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Source: <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-049a>



Official website of the Department of Homeland Security



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National Cyber Awareness System > Alerts > Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

### Alert (AA20-049A)

#### Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Original release date: February 18, 2020

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# Reference Scenarios: Cyber

## Cyber-Attack to Colonial Pipeline

Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password - The hack took down **the largest fuel pipeline in the U.S.** and led to **shortages across the East Coast.**

It was the **result of a single compromised password**

Hackers gained **entry** into the networks of Colonial Pipeline Co. **on April 29** through a **virtual private network account**

**May 7<sup>th</sup>**, an employee in Colonial's control room **saw a ransom note ....**

**May 7<sup>th</sup>** Colonial **shuts down the pipeline**

Colonial **began resuming service on May 12<sup>th</sup>**

**No breach the more critical operational technology systems**

Source: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/hackers-breached-colonial-pipeline-using-compromised-password>




It was the first time Colonial had shut down the entirety of its gasoline pipeline system in its 57-year history

Colonial paid the hackers a **\$4.4 million ransom**



# Solutions




<https://youtu.be/vFa5qFTMzWI>





# Validated in 3 Business Cases




**BC3:** Operationalising cyber-physical resilience for the security and asset integrity of strategic gas installation.

It addresses Production and Transportation (**Upstream to Midstream**) with particular emphasis on import pipelines and connections with National Grids.



**BC1:** Risk-based security asset life-cycle management.

Transportation and Distribution (**Midstream up to Downstream**) of Gas at strategic (project planning), tactical (project risk assessment) and operational (Distribution Network) level



**BC2:** Impact and cascading effect of cyber-physical attack.

Transportation network (**midstream**) with particular emphasis to vital nodes of the network, that if damaged could cause significant disruptions and cascading effects to interconnected (energy) infrastructures



# Business Case 1

Compliance with the "Common Risk Assessment Approach" as required by EU Regulation 2017/1938

## COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR BIOMETRICS AND VIDEO ANALYTICS

Identify malicious physical presence near critical gas infrastructures and suspicious objects detected from the cameras and input sensors within or near the Cis.

## CYBER PHYSICAL CORRELATOR

A Machine Learning based tool for advanced event processing to monitor the resources of the SecureGas platform, as well as different components, aggregating the information in order to detect threats.

## RISK AWARE INFORMATION TO THE POPULATION

Enable Gas CI operators to (efficiently) notify authorities (civil protection, first responders, other CI operators) on an emergency.

## JOINT CYBER-PHYSICAL RISK & RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Enhance the security and resilience of gas CI networks, covering the main principles imposed by Resilience and Disaster Risk Management Cycle.



# Business Case 2

*Compliance with the "running .. scenarios of disruption of gas supply (e.g. transmission infrastructure, storages) ...Assessing their likely consequences";" of EU Regulation 2017/1938*

## RESILIENCE OF THE IT/OT NETWORKS

Improving security weaknesses in interface points between IT and OT networks (e.g. hacked/infected control server issuing fault/non reliable commands via OT (SCADA) protocol, fault information report).

## GAS NETWORK MODELLING AND SIMULATIONS

Modelling and simulation of coupled gas grids, combining the already available modelling techniques with a thorough inclusion of quantitative response and recovery models.

## UAVs FOR LEAKS DETECTION

Application of UAVs for leaks detection of buried pipelines and decision support to the operator.

## JOINT CYBER-PHYSICAL RISK & RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Enhance the security and resilience of gas CI networks, covering the main principles imposed by Resilience and Disaster Risk Management Cycle.

## BUSINESS CASE 2





# Business Case 3

*Compliance with the "develop and agree on preventive and emergency measures" as required by EU Regulation 2017/1938*

## THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE AND LEAKS DETECTION

Leaks detection, due to TPI and external sources via Distributed Fiber Optics and Vibroacoustic sensors.

## RESILIENCE OF THE OT/IT NETWORK

Protection from «Man in the Middle Attack» to SCADA system by means of components that protect the SCADA network.

## ACQUIRE AND GEO-REFERENCE ANY CHANGES

Patrolling via UAVs, programmable on demand by the operator and triggered by the leaks or intrusion detections.

## MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING OF LANDSLIDES

Hazard mapping and an early warning alert system for rainfall-induced landslides, specifically tailored to onshore linear infrastructures such.

## BUSINESS CASE 3



# Research & Innovation as an opportunity



- In a dynamically evolving context, **the challenges poses by Cyber Threats are even more relevant**
- **New and more complex type of attacks** will cause **severe consequences** to the Energy (O&G) companies at both operational and financial level (see for instance the Colonial Pipeline)
- There is the **need for more and new “solutions”** to cope with these issues and **for a “paradigm” shift** that moves **from PROTECTION TO RESILIENCE**, aimed at preventing, promptly detecting, timely responding to and cost-effectively recovering from disruptions caused by cyber Threats
- **Research & Innovation** in this field **is therefore essential** not only at **“operational” level** with new tools, solutions and applications to be developed but also at **“strategic” level** to enforce a Resilience approach into the management processes of the organizations



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The banner for a webinar by Cyberwatching.eu features a light blue background with a hexagonal grid pattern. The Cyberwatching.eu logo is in the top left, with the tagline 'The European watch on cybersecurity & privacy'. The main title 'Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures' and subtitle 'Resilience and trust in the Health and Energy sectors' are enclosed in an orange-bordered box. Below this, the hashtag '#ConcertationMeeting Webinar Series' is displayed. The date '24 June 2021' and time '09:15-12:00 CEST' are listed next to an orange 'Online' button. The background includes icons for a shield, a stethoscope, and a lightning bolt.

**cyberwatching.eu**  
The European watch on cybersecurity & privacy

**Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures**  
Resilience and trust in the Health and Energy sectors

#ConcertationMeeting Webinar Series

Online | 24 June 2021  
09:15-12:00 CEST